






Why Have Girls Gone to College? A Quantitative Examination of the 






Department of Economics 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
 
 
Working Paper No. 10-16R 




This paper documents a dramatic increase in the college enrollment rate of women from 
1955 to 1980 and asks a quantitative question: to what extent can such increase be 
accounted for by the change in the female cohort-specific college wage premium? I 
develop and calibrate an overlapping generations model with discrete schooling choice. I 
find that changes in the life-cycle earnings differential can explain the increase in the 
female college enrollment rate very well. Young women's changing expectations of 
future earnings may also play an important role in driving their college attendance 
decision. 
 
Key Words: Female College Enrollment rate, College Wage Premium, Life-cycle 
JEL Classification: E24, J24, J31, I21 
 
                                                 
*This paper is a substantially revised version of an earlier paper listed as UHM Working Paper No. 09-12. 
This paper is based on the third chapter of my dissertation at the University of Minnesota. I thank Kelley 
Bedard, Michele Boldrin, Zvi Eckstein, and participants at the 2007 North American Summer Meeting of 
the Econometric Society for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are my own. 
† Mailing address: Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders 
Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 (e-mail: huihe@hawaii.edu) 1 Introduction
Female college attainment in the United States has changed dramatically over the last
50 years. In 1955, only 34.7% of college students were women. This ratio increased
to 56.3% in 2001 (National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Education
Statistics 2003, Table 174). The major reason behind this dramatic increase in
female college attainment is the rising college enrollment rate of women over the
past ￿ve decades. As shown in Figure 1, the female college enrollment rate of recent
high school graduates (individuals age 16 to 24 who graduated from high school or
completed a GED during the preceding 12 months) was only 34.6% in 1955; however,
it has been increasing since then. In 1980, this rate increased to 51.8%. In 2002,
68.4% of female high school graduates went to college.1
A well-known phenomenon in the US labor market is the rising college wage
premium over the past 50 years (except that it decreased in the 1970s, Katz and
Murphy 1992, Katz and Autor 1999). Data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) show that this is also true for females. The ratio of the annual mean wage of
female college graduates to high school graduates increased from 1.44 in 1963 to 1.51
in 1969. It then decreased from 1.49 in 1970 to 1.38 in 1980. The ratio, however,
1College enrollment rates for the 1960-2002 period are taken from the National Center for Ed-
ucational Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2003, Table 186. The data for 1955-1959 were
calculated by the author. See He (2009) Appendix A for the data construction.






















Figure 1: Female college enrollment rate of recent high school graduates
2has increased dramatically since 1980. In 2001, it was 1.91. This data pattern of the
aggregate wage premium also a⁄ects the cohort-based life-cycle female wage premium
as shown in Section 3.1.
This paper investigates the connection between these two phenomena by asking a
quantitative question: to what extent can the changes in the female college enrollment
rate from 1955 to 1980 be explained by the changes in the female cohort-speci￿c life-
cycle college wage premium? In order to answer this question, this paper develops
and calibrates a discrete time overlapping generations model with endogenous college-
entry decision. Di⁄erent cohorts of women enter into the economy at age 18 and face
the decision whether or not to go to college. The decision is based on the comparison
of their expected future wage di⁄erentials, their forgone wages during their college
years, their tuition payments, and their idiosyncratic disutility costs, which capture
the non-pecuniary costs of a college education. The decision in turn determines their
consumption, savings and wages over the life-cycle until age 65.
The economic mechanism between the rising female college enrollment rate and
the rising female college wage premium is intuitive. The increasing wage premium
raises the expected wage di⁄erentials, which lead to higher bene￿ts of a college
education. Since the female college wage premium has been increasing for most of
the time since 1955, one would expect to ￿nd that more and more women go to
3college.
Inputting the cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage pro￿les into the model, I ￿nd that
the model works quite well in capturing the rising female college enrollment rate
during the period 1955-1980. The rising college wage premium is the major driving
force behind the substantial increase in women￿ s college attainment. The results
also suggest that the change in expectations of future employment opportunity and
earnings among young women may have played an important role in driving the
enrollment rate since the early 1970s.
This paper contributes to a large empirical literature on studying female college
enrollment.2 Averett and Burton (1996) study how one cohort (those ages 14 to
21 in 1979) responded to the jump in the college wage premium after 1980. They
￿nd that the e⁄ect of the college wage premium for women is small and statistically
insigni￿cant. Jacob (2002) ￿nds that higher returns to college education and the
greater non-cognitive skills among women account for nearly 90 percent of the gender
gap in the college attendance rate in 1988. These papers do not examine the time
trend of the female college enrollment rate. Anderson (2002), however, tries to
answer the same question by looking at di⁄erent cohorts over time. She ￿nds that an
2Most of this literature focuses on studying the gender di⁄erence in college attainment. Since it
is well known that non-economic factors such as the Korean and Vietnam wars (through the GI Bill
and the military draft) had a signi￿cant impact on male college attendance during the 1955-1980
period (Bound and Turner 2002, Card and Lemieux 2001) and they cannot be easily captured in
the model, this paper ignores the male side and focuses only on female college-entry decisions.
4important component of the increase in female enrollment over time is the behavior of
older women, who enrolled less frequently than men when young, but who later made
up for this lack of higher education. Charles and Luoh (2003) argue that not only the
expected earnings di⁄erential but also the anticipated dispersion of future earnings
determine people￿ s educational investment decisions. Using the CPS data, they show
that the dispersion of future earnings for college-educated women has decreased over
the past three decades. Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) document the reversal
of the college gender gap and argue that the relatively greater economic bene￿ts of
college education and the relatively lower non-pecuniary costs of college attendance
for women play a key role in explaining this reversal.
This work is more closely related to a growing literature that employs structural
models to quantitatively decompose the driving force behind the female college-entry
decision and educational attainment.3 Ge (2010) structurally estimates a dynamic
choice model of college attendance, labor supply, and marriage and ￿nds that mar-
riage bene￿ts from college attendance are important in determining young women￿ s
schooling choice. Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002) develop an overlapping gen-
erations model with endogenous schooling, marriage and fertility choice to study why
the ratio of male to female college graduates (sex college attainment ratio, SCAR)
3There is a growing literature that uses a dynamic model to study the rising female labor supply
(Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos 2008, Olivetti 2006, and Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti 2004).
5was so high in the 1970s. These papers, however, do not study the changes in college
education attainment over time. Sanchez-Marcos (2008) builds on Rios-Rull and
Sanchez-Marcos (2002) to quantify the reduction in the SCAR. She ￿nds that ob-
served changes in earnings and fertility can account for a substantial fraction of the
reduction in the college attainment gender gap. However, changes in marital status
and marital sorting go in the direction of reducing the college attainment of women.
However, she compares the SCAR only in 1976 and 1990 and does not examine the
time path of the changes in college education attainment. Ge and Yang (forthcom-
ing) develop a discrete choice model of college-entry decisions with a rich structure in
marriage and fertility to quantify the e⁄ects of changes in relative earnings, changes
in parental education, and changes in the marriage market on changes in college
attainment by gender from 1980 to 1996. They ￿nd that the increasing gap in earn-
ings between college and high school graduates and increasing parental education
have important e⁄ects on the increase in college attainment for both genders but
cannot explain the reversal of the gender gap. Changes in the marriage market via
the increasing probability of divorce are crucial in explaining the relative increase in
female college attainment. The current paper, in spirit, is quite close to Ge and Yang
(forthcoming), although it puts less emphasis on the e⁄ects of marriage and fertility
but has a relatively rich structure in consumption and savings. The results show
6that the change in life-cycle earnings is a key factor in accounting for the changes in
the female college enrollment rate for the 1955-1980 period, which is the period Ge
and Yang (forthcoming) do not cover.4
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of the college attendance decision. Section 3 describes the data and analyzes
some ￿ndings from the data. Section 4 presents the results of the benchmark model.
Section 5 conducts several counterfactual experiments. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I present the economic model that will be used later for calibra-
tion. The framework is similar to the one used in He (2009). It is a discrete time
overlapping generations (OLG) model. Individuals make the schooling choice in the
￿rst period. There is only one good in the economy, which can be used either for
consumption or for investment. There is no uncertainty in the model. Individuals
have perfect foresight.
4Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2010) use a model similar to the one in this paper to investigate
the increase of educational attainment (measured by average years of schooling) of white males
from 1940 to 2000. They conclude that changes in return to schooling can account for the entire
increase in educational attainment in the data.
72.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of ￿nite-lived women with
total measure one. Women enter into the economy (or are ￿born￿ ) with zero initial
assets when they are age 18, which is the common age of high school graduates. I
call them the birth cohort and model age as j = 1. They then live and work up to
age J. To distinguish between the age of a cohort and calendar time, I use j for age,
and t for calendar time.
2.2 Preferences











where cj;t+j￿1 is consumption for the age-j woman at time t + j ￿ 1. ￿ is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. 1
￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Since leisure does not enter into the utility function, each woman will supply all of
8her labor endowment, which is normalized to be one.
2.3 Budget Constraints
A woman chooses go to college or not at the beginning of the ￿rst period. I use
s 2 fc;hg to indicate this choice. If an individual chooses s = h; she ends up with
a high school diploma and goes on the job market to work as an unskilled laborer
and earns high school graduate wage sequence fwh
jgJ
j=1. Or she can choose s = c;
spend the ￿rst four years in college as a full-time student, and pay the tuition. After
that, she goes on the labor market to ￿nd a job as a skilled worker and earns college
graduate wage sequence fwc
jgJ
j=1. For the sake of simplicity, I assume there is no
college dropout and no unemployment.5
For s = c; the budget constraints of an individual born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + tuitiont+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 8j = 1;2;3;4 (2)
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + w
c
j;t+j￿1 8j = 5;:::;J
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0:
In the ￿rst four periods, she pays tuition tuitiont+j￿1, consumes cj;t+j￿1, and saves
5Ge and Yang (forthcoming) make the same assumption.
9aj;t+j￿1. After graduation, she earns wage wc
j;t+j￿1 at age j and consumes and saves
subject to what she earns and accumulates. Notice that there is no borrowing con-
straint in this economy. Since they do not have any initial assets, college students
need to borrow money for consumption and pay tuition during the ￿rst four periods,
and they pay back the loans later.6
For s = h; the budget constraints of an individual born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + w
h
j;t+j￿1 8j = 1;:::;J (3)
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0:
2.4 Schooling Choice
I assume that di⁄erent individuals within the birth cohort are endowed with di⁄erent
levels of ability. And ability a⁄ects only individuals￿disutility cost of schooling.7 The
disutility cost of schooling is a strictly decreasing function of ability. Higher ability
implies lower disutility cost.
Individuals are indexed by their ability level i 2 [0;1]. The CDF of the ability
6Cameron and Taber (2004) ￿nd no evidence that access to borrowing is an important component
of schooling decisions.
7This is a common assumption in the literature. Ge and Yang (forthcoming) and Restuccia and
Vandenbroucke (2010) have a similar assumption. Navarro (2007) empirically ￿nds learning ability
is the main determinant of this ￿psychic￿ cost and it plays a key role in determining schooling
decisions.
10distribution is denoted by F, F(i0) = Pr(i ￿ i0): DIS(i) represents the ability-
related disutility cost for individual i. Notice that DIS(i) ￿ 0 and DIS0(i) < 0. An










1 if si = c
0 if si = h
:
She maximizes her lifetime utility subject to the budget constraints (2) or (3) con-
ditional on her educational choice. If an individual chooses to go to college, she
has to bear the idiosyncratic disutility cost. Notice that the disutility cost DIS(i)
does not enter into the budget constraint; therefore, everyone with the same educa-
tional achievement from the same birth cohort has the same lifetime utility derived
from physical consumption. I use UTILc to denote the discounted lifetime utility
for college graduates; UTILh denotes the discounted lifetime utility derived from
physical consumption for high school graduates. UTILc ￿ UTILh represents the
utility gain from attending college. Obviously, individual i will choose to go to col-
lege if DIS(i) < [UTILc ￿ UTILh]; not to go if DIS(i) > [UTILc ￿ UTILh], and
is indi⁄erent if DIS(i) = [UTILc ￿ UTILh].




















Here NPV stands for the net present value of higher education. Since wc
j;t+j￿1 =
0;8j = 1;:::4, students never work when they stay in college, and I can further




















The ￿rst term represents the bene￿ts of schooling: college graduates can earn more
through the earnings di⁄erential. The second term represents the opportunity cost of
schooling: it is the present value of four years of forgone wages for college students.
The third term is the present value of tuition paid during the college years, which
represents the direct cost of schooling. From this representation it is very clear






j=1 is going to a⁄ect
people￿ s schooling decision. Other things being equal, an increase in the lifetime
college wage premium raises the bene￿ts of schooling, hence NPV . Higher NPV
12induces a higher utility gain from schooling UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t. Given the stationary
distribution of the disutility cost, a higher utility gain from schooling means more
likely DIS(i) < [UTILc ￿ UTILh], which implies a higher enrollment rate.
The basic intuition of this model can also be seen in Figure 2. In this ￿gure, the
x-axis measures ability i. Women are ranked from zero to one by their ability. The
disutility cost DIS(i) is a decreasing function of the ability index i. V D represents
the utility gain from attending college UTILc ￿ UTILh. The cut-o⁄ ability (or





Therefore, women with ability i < i￿ will choose not to go to college, while women
with i > i￿ will choose to go.8 The enrollment rate thus is equal to the probability
when i > i￿. If the college wage premium increases over the life-cycle, so does the
NPV ; therefore, the utility gain V D increases to V D0, and this will decrease the
cut-o⁄ point to i￿0. Since Pr(i > i￿0) > Pr(i > i￿); more women go to college. A
higher life-cycle earnings di⁄erential thus encourages college attendance.
8Ge and Yang (forthcoming) and Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2010) also have a similar thresh-
old mechanism to determine the schooling choices in their model.
13Figure 2: The determination of the college enrollment rate
142.5 Dynamic Programming Representation
For purposes of computation, it is easier to write an individual￿ s schooling decision
problem in terms of dynamic programming language. Let V c
t+j￿1(aj￿1;t+j￿2;j) denote
the value function of an age-j woman with asset holding aj￿1;t+j￿2 at the beginning








t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (6)
subject to the budget constraint (2).








t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (7)
subject to budget constraint (3).
Individuals solve their perfect foresight dynamic problem by using backward in-
duction. Back to age 1 at time t, a woman with ability index i will make her schooling
15decision si;t based on the criteria below
si;t = c if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) > V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1);
si;t = h if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) < V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1); (8)
si;t = indi⁄erent if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) = V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1):
3 Data
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1962 to 2003 to construct
the data counterparts in the model. I choose the sample restrictions to follow those
used in Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004) except I further restrict the data to include only
high school graduates (HSG hereafter) between ages 18 and 65 and college graduates
(CG) between ages 22 and 65 in the sample. As Eckstein and NagypÆl￿ s paper, I
restrict my attention to full-time full-year (FTFY) workers. The wage here is the
annualized wage and salary earnings. I use the personal consumption expenditure
de￿ ator from NIPA to convert all wages in terms of constant 2002 dollars.
163.1 Cohort-Speci￿c Wage Premium
In the model, women in di⁄erent cohorts make the educational decision based on the
expected earnings di⁄erential speci￿c to their cohort. The perfect foresight assump-
tion allows me to use actual observed future earnings in the CPS as the measure
of expected future earnings. Since the CPS is a repeated cross-sectional data set, I
use a so-called ￿pesudo-cohort construction method￿to construct the cohort-speci￿c
expected wage pro￿les.9 For example, the 1962 cohort￿ s (18-year-old HSG in 1962)
lifetime (18-65 years old) female HSG wage pro￿le fwh
j;1961+jg48
j=1 is constructed as
follows: I take 18-year-old female HSGs in 1962, calculate their mean wage, then
19-year-old female HSGs in 1963, calculate the mean wage, then 20-year-old female
HSGs in 1964, 21-year-old female HSGs in 1965, and so on, until I reach 58-year-old
female HSGs in 2002, which is the end year of my CPS data set.
I use a similar approach to construct the 1962 cohort￿ s female CG wage pro￿le
fwc
j;1961+jg48
j=1. But I start from 1966 because if someone from the 1962 cohort chooses
to go to college, she needs to spend four years in college. She graduates in 1966 and
starts to earn CG wages from that year. Therefore, I take 22-year-old female CGs
in 1966, calculate their mean wage, then calculate the mean wage for 23-year-old
9It is a pesudo-cohort because the CPS is not a panel data set. It does not track people over their
lifetimes. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) use a similar method to estimate the cohort-based
return to schooling.
17female CGs in 1967, and so on.
Figure 3 shows the life-cycle wage pro￿les for six cohorts. They are the 1955,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980 cohorts. For each cohort, the wage pro￿le of CGs is
signi￿cantly higher than that of HSGs. Two facts about the life-cycle wage pro￿les
need to be mentioned here: (1) Earnings rise with age, but at a decreasing rate;
(2) Earnings increase faster for more educated workers, which implies CGs have a
steeper hump-shaped (or increasing but concave) wage pro￿le than that of HSGs.
Notice that for the 1955 and 1960 cohorts, the late-age earnings for CGs become
quite noisy. This is due to the smaller sample size for CGs at the later age.






j=1 exhibits some interest-
ing patterns for these cohorts. Due to data availability, I calculate the wage premium
only from age 22 to age 40. The average college wage premium from age 22 to age
40 for the 1955 cohort was 1.45. For the 1960 cohort, it was 1.48. It then decreased
signi￿cantly to 1.38 for the 1965 cohort and 1.39 for the 1970 cohort. For these
two cohorts, the compressed college wage premium in the 1970s signi￿cantly reduced
their earnings di⁄erential at their prime age when the CG wage pro￿le is in a stage of
steep ascent. In contrast, the rising college wage premium starting from 1980 helped
to increase the average college wage premium from age 22 to 40 for the 1975 and
1980 cohorts to 1.56 and 1.63, respectively.



























































































































Figure 3: Life-cycle wage pro￿les for six cohorts
19Following the pesudo-cohort construction method, I am able to construct life-
cycle wage pro￿les for HSGs and CGs from the 1955 to the 1980 cohort. However,
due to the time range of the CPS data, I do not have a complete life-cycle wage
pro￿le for any cohort. For example, some cohorts miss the later age data points
(cohorts after 1961), and some miss the early age data points (cohorts between 1955
and 1960). I use the econometric method to predict the mean wage at that speci￿c
age to extrapolate the missing data. I predict them by either second- or third-order





















My extrapolation stops after the 1980 cohort because after this cohort, a lack of data
points creates trouble; hence, I do not have a reliable prediction.10 By ￿lling in the
missing data, eventually I obtain complete cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage pro￿les for
HSGs and CGs from the 1955 to the 1980 cohort.
These cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage pro￿les provide the information needed in
the ￿rst two terms of equation (5). To fully understand the higher education choice
10The 1980 cohort has life-cycle wage pro￿les only up to age 40 from the CPS data. Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd (2003) also notice this problem and stop in 1983 for their cohort-based estimates.
20over time, I also need information about tuition, which is the direct cost of college
education as in the third term of equation (5). In Figure 4 I report the real tuition,
fees, room and board (TFRB) per student charged by an average four-year institution
in terms of constant 2002 dollars.11 TFRB increased over time except in the 1970s,
when it became stable. Starting in 1980, real TFRB increased dramatically. Di⁄erent
cohorts face di⁄erent TFRB charges based on the years during which they attended
college.
4 Results
In this section, the economic model in Section 2 is calibrated to generate the female
college enrollment rate. The calibration strategy I employ here is to adopt the
common values widely used in the literature for the preference parameters. For
the model-speci￿c disutility parameter b (see equation (9) below), I calibrate it to
match the enrollment rate data of the initial cohort (HSGs in 1955). Under these
calibrated parameter values, I then input the data of cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage
pro￿les and real TFRB in Section 3 into the model. Given that I have enough
information about individuals￿budget constraints, I am able to solve their dynamic
programming problem as in (6) and (7). Finally, I use the criterion in (8) to determine
11See He (2009) for the explanation to construct this data sequence.
























Figure 4: Real tuition, fees, room and board charge per student
22the enrollment rate in di⁄erent years.
4.1 Calibration
The value of discount factor ￿ is taken to be 0.96 to match the interest rate r, which
is set to 4%.12 The value of the CRRA coe¢ cient ￿ is 2, which is widely used in the
life-cycle literature.
For simplicity, I assume that the ability level i is uniformly distributed among





I assume that this cost function is also time invariant. For the lowest ability indi-
vidual (i = 0), DIS(i) = 1, so she will never go to college. On the other hand, for
the highest ability individual (i = 1), DIS(i) = 0. Since the present value of the
life-cycle wage pro￿le of CGs is higher than that of HSGs (see Figure 3), she will
certainly choose to go to college. Given this functional form, as is shown in Section
2, the college enrollment rate at time t is determined by the threshold level i￿
t as in
12An unreported experiment shows that the benchmark results are very robust to di⁄erent com-
binations of ￿ and r.
23Parameters Description Value
￿ discount factor 0.96
￿ CRRA coe¢ cient 2
b scale factor of disutility cost function 7.28
r real interest rate 4%






t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1):
Since ability level is uniformly distributed and DIS0(i) < 0, the enrollment rate at
time t is equal to Pr(i > i￿
t) = 1 ￿ F(i￿
t) = 1 ￿ i￿
t.
I calibrate the scale factor of disutility cost function b to match the female college
enrollment rate data in 1955, which is 34.6%. This ends up with b = 7:28.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the model.
4.2 Findings
Based on the parameter values shown in Table 1, at year t I solve the birth cohort￿ s
dynamic problem using a standard numerical method to obtain the di⁄erence in value
function V Dt = V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1). This di⁄erence determines a
unique threshold level i￿
t and hence the corresponding college enrollment rate at year
24t (et)
et = Pr(i > i
￿
t) = 1 ￿ i
￿
t.
Figure 5 compares the female college enrollment rates from the model with those
in the data from 1955 to 1980. The model replicates the rising trend of college
enrollment rates for females very well. In the data, the enrollment rate increased
from 34.6% in 1955 to 51.8% in 1980; in the model, it increased from 34.6% to
52.0%.
Looking at a detailed comparison, from 1955 to 1960, the model predicts that the
enrollment rate increased from 34.6% to 39.2%; in the data it increased from 34.6%
to 38.0%. The model actually overshoots the data for this period. It implies that
some factor other than the life-cycle earnings di⁄erential was deterring women from
going to college in that period. From 1960 to 1966, the prediction from the model
is quite in line with the data. However, from 1967 to 1972, the model signi￿cantly
underpredicts the college enrollment rate for females. In 1967, the enrollment rate
was 47.2% in the data, while the model predicts a rate of only 40.6%, which was
6.6% lower than the data. Similarly, in 1970, the college enrollment rate was 48.5%
in the data, while it was 43.2% in the model.
One possible reason for the underprediction of the female college enrollment rate
in the model during that period is that the model does not capture the changing





















Figure 5: Female college enrollment rate: model vs. data
26social norms and expectations about the role of work among young women in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. As evidence of this changing social norm, Astin, Oseguera,
Sax, and Korn (2002) report the results of the Astin Freshman Survey, which is a
national sample of college freshmen, the vast majority of whom were 18 years old.
In the survey, the freshmen agreed or disagreed with the statement: ￿The activities
of married women are best con￿ned to the home and family.￿The fraction of female
freshmen disagreeing with this statement increased dramatically from 59% in 1967
to 83% in 1973. The fraction, however, has been quite stable since then.
Rising expectations of future employment certainly encouraged girls to go to col-
lege. Based on the observation from the Astin Freshmen Survey and their own data,
Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) estimate that the change in expectations about
future labor participation would account for a 4.8 to a 5.7 percentage point increase
in the female college graduation rate from 1968 to 1979. The college enrollment rate
in the current model from 1967 to 1972 on average is below that in the data by 5
percentage points. Since in the model the college enrollment rate is equal to the
college completion rate, changes in expectations among young women could capture
the entire di⁄erence between the model￿ s prediction and the data.13
Since 1972, the model has done a very good job of replicating the data. In the
13The counterfactual experiment in Section 5.2 provides further evidence for changing expecta-
tions of future earnings among young women since the late 1960s.
27data, the female college enrollment rate increased from 46.0% in 1972 to 51.8% in
1980. The model counterpart was from 46.5% to 52%. Girls who graduated from
high school around that time had already witnessed a drastic increase in the female
labor force participation rate and formed their expectations accordingly; therefore,
it is not surprising to see that the decision to go to college is entirely driven by
economic concerns. The higher college wage premium for females since 1980 has
raised the bene￿ts of attending college as shown in the ￿rst term of equation (5). It
was a signi￿cant factor in encouraging girls to go to college.
To summarize, the results show that the human capital investment model works
quite well to capture the rising female college enrollment rate from 1955 to 1980. The
results also suggest that the changing expectations of future employment opportunity
among young women may also play an important role in driving this enrollment rate
especially during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
5 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, I run a series of counterfactual experiments to quantify the e⁄ects
of changing tuition costs, the assumption of perfect foresight, time-varying disutility
costs, and the distribution of disutility costs on the female college enrollment rate.
285.1 Fixed Tuition Cost
In order to quantify the e⁄ects of changing tuition costs over the target period, I ￿x
tuition costs at the level of the 1955 cohort. Therefore, the 1956-1980 cohorts face
the same tuition costs as the 1955 cohort. Figure 6 shows the results. Compared to
the benchmark case, when the tuition cost is ￿xed at the level for the 1955 cohort, the
female college enrollment rate increases only slightly over the period. Therefore, the
direct cost of schooling apparently is not a signi￿cant factor in determining women￿ s
college entrance behavior.14
5.2 Naive Expectations
To test whether the benchmark results are sensitive to the assumption of perfect
foresight, I change the assumption to naive expectations, which means individuals
can forecast their future earnings based only on the observed cross-sectional earnings
at the time they are making the college entry decision. For example, for the women
in the 1970 cohort, I do not input their cohort-speci￿c wage pro￿les in the model.
I rather use the cross-sectional wage pro￿les for ages 18-65 in 1970 to proxy their
life-cycle wage pro￿les. Due to data availability, I have annual cross-sectional wage
pro￿les from 1961 to 2002 from the CPS. In order to compare this with the benchmark
14Ge and Yang (forthcoming) obtain similar results.






















Figure 6: No change in tuition cost






















Figure 7: Naive expectations vs. perfect foresight
case, I input the pro￿les for the period 1961-1980 in the model. The results are
presented in Figure 7.15
Figure 7 shows a very interesting pattern. The model with naive expectations
actually matches the data better from 1961 to 1972. It especially ￿ts the data
from 1966 to 1972 when the benchmark model signi￿cantly underpredicts the data.
However, It predicts that the enrollment rate decreased from 46.3% in 1973 to 37.1%
15For the purposes of comparison, I calibrate scale factor b di⁄erently to match the enrollment
rate in 1961 in the benchmark model and the model with naive expectations respectively.
31in 1980, while in the data it increased from 43.4% to 51.8%. The benchmark model
with perfect foresight, however, matches the data for the period 1973 to 1980. The
reason the model with naive expectations works better in the 1960s is that the cross-
sectional wage premium increased in that decade, while for the perfect foresight
benchmark model, cohorts in the 1960s faced a decreasing wage premium in the early
stage of their life-cycle, which reduced the incentive to go to college. However, the
decreasing college wage premium in the 1970s reduces the cross-sectional earnings
di⁄erential more severely than the life-cycle ones because for the latter the rising
wage premium since 1980 compensates for the loss in the 1970s. For the model with
naive expectations, individuals are short sighted and they feel the compressed wage
premium only when they make the decision to attend college. For the benchmark
model with perfect foresight, the rising college wage premium since 1980 signi￿cantly
raised the future earnings di⁄erential for college-age women in the 1970s and hence
encouraged them to go to college.
The ￿nding in Figure 7 suggests that around the early 1970s there is a dramatic
change in the way women form their expectations of future earnings. It moves from
myopic to more forward looking. Interestingly, the timing coincides with the ￿nding
of Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006), who claim that ￿rapidly changing expecta-
tions among young women concerning their future life-cycle labor force participation
32started in the late 1960s.￿They argue that this change might be due to increasing
female labor force participation rates, the legality and widespread acceptance of the
￿pill,￿and the resurgence of feminism. The results in Figure 7 provide evidence of
the changing expectations from a di⁄erent angle.
5.3 Changing Disutility Costs
In the third experiment, I investigate the importance of the assumption of stationary
distribution of the disutility cost DIS(i). In particular, I ask the question: given the
cohort-speci￿c wage pro￿les, in order to exactly match the female college enrollment
rate in the data, how should the scale factor of disutility cost b change over time?
Figure 8 shows the level of b for each year from 1955 to 1980 that matches the
female college enrollment rate in the data. The trend line is slightly decreasing
over the years. However, the t-statistics of the OLS regression coe¢ cient are not
signi￿cant.16 We cannot reject the assumption that b is constant over time.















Figure 8: Changing scale factor of the disutility cost
345.4 Distribution of Disutility Costs
In the benchmark model, we make a speci￿c assumption about the distribution of
ability i in the function of the disutility cost. To test if the results are robust to the
choice of the distribution of ability, I follow Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2010) to
consider a more general Beta distribution of ability. i ￿ Beta(A;C), where i 2 [0;1]
and A and C are the two positive parameters governing the shape of the distribution.
The uniform distribution I assume in the benchmark model is just a special case of
the Beta distribution with A = C = 1. Now there are three parameters in the
function of disutility cost DIS(i): b, A, and C: I calibrate these three parameters to
match the college enrollment rates in three years over the period 1955-1980.17
Figure 9 shows that with this more general distribution of ability, the results are
still quite close to the ones in the benchmark model. The model results are robust
to the alternative distributional assumption.
To summarize, the counterfactual experiments show that the rising tuition costs
over time have little quantitative in￿ uence on the benchmark results. The results
are also robust to a more general distribution of the disutility cost. The experiments
justify the assumption that the disutility cost of schooling is quite time-invariant.
17In the current version, I calibrate b; A, and C to match the enrollment rate data in 1955, 1961
and 1974, which are the three years for which the benchmark model ￿ts the data best. The results,
however, are not quite sensitive to the years I pick.






















Figure 9: Beta distribution of ability
36Finally, the experiment testing di⁄erent assumptions of expectations provides inter-
esting evidence on young women￿ s changing expectations of future earnings over the
period 1955 to 1980.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a discrete time overlapping generations model with an endoge-
nous college-entry decision. The decision is based on the cost-bene￿t analysis implied
by the standard human capital investment theory. Two key features are exogenous
choice-dependent life-cycle wage pro￿les and an idiosyncratic disutility cost of a col-
lege education. Using this model, I quantitatively examine the driving force behind
the dramatic increase in the female college enrollment rate from 1955 to 1980. I ￿nd
that the model works quite well in capturing the rising female college enrollment
rate during this period. The rising college wage premium is the major driving force.
The results also suggest that the change in expectations of future employment op-
portunity and earnings among young women may have played an important role in
driving the enrollment rate since the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The recent literature shows that the marriage market may be an important deter-
minant in women￿ s schooling decision.18 Education may also a⁄ect women￿ s fertility
18See Ge and Yang (forthcoming) and Ge (2010).
37and marriage decisions. This paper does not address these issues. However, it would
be an interesting extension to include endogenous marriage and fertility choices in the
current model to analyze the interaction among these choices. This extended model
surely will provide a platform for understanding not only the changes in women￿ s
college-entry decisions, but also the evolution of the marriage rate and fertility deci-
sions over time. I leave that for future research.
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